

Message Text

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E O 11652: GDS
TAGS: PARM, NATO, MBFR
SUBJ: MBFR: INFORMAL SESSION WITH EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES OF
JUNE 20, 1978

1. BEGIN SUMMARY: IN THE JUNE 20, 1978 INFORMAL
SESSION OF THE VIENNA TALKS, THE ALLIES WERE REPRESENTED
BY THE CANADIAN, FRG AND US REPS, AND THE EAST BY SOVIET
REPS TARASOV AND SHUSTOV, GDR REP OESER, AND POLISH REP
STRULAK. MILITARY ADVISORS WERE ALSO PRESENT.

2. DURING THE SESSION, WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES
ASKED FURTHER QUESTIONS ON THE EASTERN PROPOSAL AND ON
EASTERN DATA AND POINTED OUT THE DEFECTS OF THE EASTERN
PROPOSAL TO GIVE THE SOVIET UNION DISCRETION IN THE
SECOND PHASE TO ANNUL A PHASE I AGREEMENT. EASTERN
REPRESENTATIVES PRAISED THE MERITS OF THEIR JUNE 8
PROPOSAL FOCUSING ON ITS COVERAGE OF PHASE II

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REDUCTIONS, AND ANSWERED EARLIER QUESTIONS BY THE WEST
ON THE JUNE 8 EASTERN PROPOSAL AND ON EASTERN DATA.

3. TARASOV DID NOT DENY WESTERN REPS'
ANALYSIS THAT UNDER THE EAST'S PROPOSAL FOR OPERATION OF
COLLECTIVE CEILINGS THE SOVIET UNION COULD RESTORE
MILITARY MANPOWER TO THEIR PRE-REDUCTION LEVEL NEARLY IMME-

DIATELY BUT CLAIMED THAT WESTERN REPS HAD ADVANCED A HIGHLY
HYPOTHETICAL SITUATION. IN RESPONSE TO THE WESTERN POINT THAT EASTERN
PROPOSALS MIGHT MAKE IT MATHEMATICALLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR
WESTERN PARTICIPANTS TO COMPENSATE FULLY FOR UNILATERAL
FORCE REDUCTIONS AFTER AN AGREEMENT HAD BEEN IMPLEMENTED,
TARASOV APPEARED TO SOLICIT WESTERN COUNTER PROPOSALS.

4. GDR REP SAID THE UNIT LIMITATIONS PROPOSED
BY THE EAST WOULD BE APPLIED TO THE LARGEST-SIZE UNITS
REDUCED BY EACH INDIVIDUAL DIRECT PARTICIPANT AND THEN
ONLY ON THE UNITS OF THE FUNCTIONAL TYPE ACTUALLY REDUCED, SUCH AS
TANK BATTALIONS. GDR REP CONFIRMED THAT ARMAMENTS
AND EQUIPMENT OF WITHDRAWN US UNITS, OTHER THAN THE NUCLEAR
ELEMENTS WHOSE WITHDRAWAL HAD BEEN PROPOSED BY THE WEST,
COULD BE LEFT OR REMOVED FROM THE REDUCTION AREA AT THE
DISCRETION OF US AUTHORITIES. GDR REP NEXT CHALLENGED
WESTERN REPS TO PRESENT WESTERN ESTIMATES OF THE MILITARY
MANPOWER OF INDIVIDUAL WARSAW TREATY DIRECT PARTICIPANTS,
IN ORDER, HE STATED, TO HELP IDENTIFY THE SOURCES OF THE
DISCREPANCY AND TO SHORTEN THE DATA DISCUSSION.

5. CANADIAN REP POINTED OUT THAT THE EAST'S
PROPOSAL WOULD PLACE THE SOVIET UNION IN THE POSITION OF
BEING SOLE JUDGE OF THE ADEQUACY OF PHASE II WESTERN
EUROPEAN REDUCTIONS. WESTERN PARTICIPANTS COULD NOT KNOW
WHAT USE THE SOVIET UNION WOULD ACTUALLY MAKE OF THIS
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BLANK CHECK DISCRETION IF IT POSSESSED IT OR WHAT
REDUCTIONS IT WOULD INSIST ON. IT DID NOT APPEAR TO
WESTERN PARTICIPANTS THAT SUCH A DRASTIC AND ARBITRARY
CONCEPT WOULD PROVIDE A WORKABLE SOLUTION TO THE PROPOSAL
OF WHAT TO DO IF PHASE II NEGOTIATIONS FAILED TO REACH
TIMELY AGREEMENT. THE WESTERN PROPOSALS OF APRIL 19
REPRESENTED A MORE POSITIVE METHOD OF DEALING WITH THIS
PROPOSAL AND A METHOD WHICH WOULD NOT RISK DRAWING AWAY THE
HARD-WON RESULTS OF A FIRST AGREEMENT. FRG REP GAVE
EAST FURTHER QUESTIONS ON EASTERN DATA. IN VIEW OF THEIR
TOPICAL NATURE, WE ARE REPORTING TELEGRAPHICALLY PORTIONS
OF THE RECORD. THE FULL RECORD WILL BE SENT BY AIRGRAM.
END SUMMARY

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6. US REP WELCOMED PARTICIPANTS. DRAWING ON TALKING
POINTS APPROVED BY THE AD HOC GROUP, HE SAID HE WOULD
NOW LIKE TO ASK SOME ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS REGARDING THE
EASTERN PROPOSAL OF JUNE 8.

7. US REP SAID HIS FIRST QUESTION WAS: IN EXPLAINING
THE DETAILS OF THE EAST'S PROPOSALS OF JUNE 8, AMBASSADOR
OESER HAD SAID ON JUNE 13 THAT THE EAST HAD EXPRESSED
ITS WILLINGNESS TO CARRY OUT REDUCTIONS OF SOVIET FORCES.
QUOTE IN DIVISIONS FORMING THE MAIN KIND OF LARGE UNITS
OF THE SOVIET ARMY UNQUOTE. PARAGRAPH 2 OF THE EAST'S
PROPOSALS FOR FIRST STAGE REDUCTIONS, HOWEVER, SAID THAT
THE USSR WOULD REDUCE QUOTE ONE ARMY CORPS HEADQUARTERS
WITH SUPPORT AND SERVICE UNITS, TWO DIVISIONS AT FULL
STRENGTH AND A NUMBER OF INDIVIDUAL TANK UNITS AND SUB-
UNITS EQUIVALENT TO ONE TANK DIVISION. UNQUOTE. TAKING
THESE TWO STATEMENTS TOGETHER, WESTERN REPS UNDERSTOOD
THAT THE EAST CONSIDERED THE SOVIET UNITS AND HEADQUARTERS
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REDUCED ALONG WITH THE TWO DIVISIONS AS CONSTITUTING THE
EQUIVALENT OF A THIRD DIVISION, IN TERMS OF NUMBERS OF MEN
AND TANKS. WAS THIS CORRECT? THE UNDERLINED QUESTION
WAS ABOUT THE MEANING OF THE TERM QUOTE EQUIVALENT
UNQUOTE IN THIS CONTEXT.

8. TARASOV REPLIED THAT, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE
PROPOSAL OF THE EASTERN PARTICIPANTS, THE SOVIET UNION

WOULD WITHDRAW TWO DIVISIONS IN FULL STRENGTH AND SOME INDIVIDUAL TANK UNITS AND SUB-UNITS EQUIVALENT TO ONE TANK DIVISION. THIS MEANT THAT THE REDUCED TANK UNITS AND SUB-UNITS WOULD, AS FAR AS THE NUMBER OF THEIR TANKS WAS CONCERNED, BE EQUIVALENT TO ONE TANK DIVISION. AS FAR AS THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH (COMMENT: MANPOWER) OF THESE TANK UNITS AND SUB-UNITS WAS CONCERNED, IT WOULD BE APPROXIMATELY EQUAL TO ONE DIVISION. IN ADDITION, THE SOVIET UNION WAS WILLING TO WITHDRAW ONE ARMY CORPS HEADQUARTERS TOGETHER WITH COMBAT SUPPORT AND SERVICE SUPPORT UNITS. THIS WOULD INCLUDE IN PARTICULAR THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE CORPS, SIGNAL SUB-UNITS, ENGINEERING AND TRANSPORTATION SUB-UNITS, GUARD SUB-UNITS, ETC., WHICH WERE DIRECTLY SUBORDINATE TO THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE CORPS. AS EASTERN REPS HAD ALREADY STATED IN THEIR PROPOSALS, THE OVERALL NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE DIVISIONS, TANK UNITS AND SUB-UNITS AND OF THE ARMY CORPS HEADQUARTERS DESIGNATED FOR WITHDRAWAL IN THE FIRST STAGE WOULD CONSIST OF APPROXIMATELY 30,000 MEN.

9. US REP SAID HIS SECOND QUESTION WAS: IN THIS CONNECTION, WESTERN REPS NOTED THAT PARAGRAPH 2 OF STAGE 1 CHARACTERIZED THE SEPARATE NON-DIVISIONAL ELEMENTS TO BE WITHDRAWN AS QUOTE EQUIVALENT TO ONE TANK DIVISION UNQUOTE. DID THIS MEAN THAT THE EAST INTENDED THAT THE
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TWO COMPLETE DIVISIONS TO BE WITHDRAWN WOULD BE TANK DIVISIONS?

10. TARASOV REPLIED THAT THE EASTERN PROPOSALS DID NOT INDICATE SPECIFICATION OF THE TWO DIVISIONS WHICH THE SOVIET UNION PROPOSED TO WITHDRAW IN FULL STRENGTH. THESE DIVISIONS COULD BE EITHER TANK DIVISION OR NON-TANK DIVISIONS, FOR EXAMPLE, MOTOR RIFLE DIVISIONS. HOWEVER, THE TOTAL NUMBER OF TANKS TO BE REDUCED, AS WAS INDICATED IN THE EASTERN PROPOSALS, WOULD CONSTITUTE 1,000 MAIN BATTLE TANKS. WHILE EXCHANGING THE LISTS OF FORMATIONS AND UNITS SUBJECT TO REDUCTION IN THE FIRST STAGE, (COMMENT: PHASE), THE EAST WOULD PRODUCE THE SPECIFIC LIST AS WAS PROVIDED FOR IN THEIR PROPOSALS. THE SPECIFIC COMPOSITION OF FORMATIONS AND UNITS WOULD BE DETERMINED BY THE EAST WHEN (TAKING) ACCOUNT OF THOSE REDUCTIONS WHICH THE US WOULD BE READY TO UNDERTAKE ITSELF.

11. US REP SAID THAT THE WESTERN PROPOSALS PROVIDED FOR EXCHANGE OF LISTS OF UNITS TO BE WITHDRAWN IN PHASE I PRIOR TO THE SIGNING OF A PHASE I AGREEMENT. THE EASTERN JUNE 8 PROPOSALS IN POINT 5 OF STAGE 1 PROVIDED THAT THIS EXCHANGE OF LISTS WOULD TAKE PLACE AT THE SIGNING OF THE PHASE I AGREEMENT. WAS IT CORRECT THAT, UNDER THE EASTERN

PROPOSALS, THE LISTS WOULD IN FACT BE EXCHANGED PRIOR TO SIGNATURE IN ORDER TO PERMIT POSSIBLE DISCUSSION BETWEEN THE SIDES AS TO THE UNITS ON THE LISTS?

12. TARASOV SAID THAT, NATURALLY, THE LISTS SPECIFYING THE ACTUAL IDENTITY, NUMERICAL STRENGTH AND LOCATION OF

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FORMATIONS, UNITS AND SUB-UNITS SUBJECT TO REDUCTION WOULD BE AGREED UPON BEFORE THE SIGNING OF AN AGREEMENT. MOREOVER, TO EXCHANGE SUCH LISTS SPECIFYING ACTUAL IDENTITY AND LOCATION OF THESE FORMATIONS, UNITS AND SUB-UNITS IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO REACH AN UNDERSTANDING UPON THE NATURE OF SUCH FORMATIONS, UNITS AND SUB-UNITS AND THEIR TOTAL NUMERICAL STRENGTH.

13. US REP SAID HIS THIRD QUESTION WAS: AT THE LAST INFORMAL SESSION, AMBASSADOR TARASOV HAD SAID THAT THE 200,000-MAN LIMITATION ON AIR FORCE MANPOWER ON EACH SIDE WOULD BE A COLLECTIVE LIMITATION. HOWEVER, PARAGRAPH 8 OF THE FIRST STAGE OF THE EASTERN PROPOSAL STATED THAT, IN THE CASE OF A UNILATERAL REDUCTION IN THE FORCES OF ANY OF THE STATES, NO OTHER STATE ON THE SAME SIDE COULD INCREASE ITS FORCES BY MORE THAN 50 PCT OF THE NUMBER OF THE UNILATERAL REDUCTIONS, AND IN NO CASE COULD EXCEED THE

NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE FORCES IT HAD BEFORE THE REDUCTION.

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DID THE EAST IN EACH OF THESE CASES MEAN BY THE WORD FORCES ONLY GROUND FORCE MANPOWER? IN OTHER WORDS, COULD ANY DIRECT PARTICIPANT INCREASE ITS AIR MANPOWER TO WHATEVER EXTENT WAS NECESSARY TO COMPENSATE FOR UNILATERAL REDUCTIONS OF AIR MANPOWER IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN THE 200,000 LEVEL ON ITS SIDE OR WOULD THE 50 PCT RULE APPLY HERE ALSO?

14. TARASOV SAID EASTERN REPS WOULD ANSWER THIS QUESTION LATER.

15. US REP STATED THAT THE WEST'S FOURTH QUESTION WAS: EASTERN REPS HAD EXPLAINED THAT THE PURPOSE OF THE 50 PCT RULE WAS TO ENSURE SOME DISTRIBUTION OF COMPENSATING INCREASES. WOULD IT NOT BE POSSIBLE UNDER THIS RULE FOR THE SOVIET UNION ALMOST IMMEDIATELY TO RETURN TO ITS STARTING LEVEL AND THUS TO NEGATE THE EFFECT OF ITS REDUCTIONS. WESTERN REPS WOULD LIKE TO POSE AN EXAMPLE OF HOW THIS MIGHT COME ABOUT: FIRST, POLAND MIGHT REDUCE BY 40,000 MEN BELOW ITS POST-REDUCTION LEVEL. AT THE SAME TIME, CZECHOSLOVAKIA MIGHT REDUCE TO 40,000 BELOW ITS POST-REDUCTION LEVEL AND THE GDR MIGHT REDUCE TO 30,000 BELOW ITS POST-REDUCTION LEVEL. THE RESULT WOULD BE THAT THE THREE NON-SOVIET EASTERN PARTICIPANTS WOULD BE 110,000 BELOW THEIR POST-REDUCTION LEVELS. IMMEDIATELY THEREAFTER, THE SOVIET UNION COULD UNDER THE EASTERN PROPOSAL MAKE UP 50 PCT OF THE TOTAL OF THESE UNILATERAL REDUCTIONS, OR 55,000 MEN. THIS FIGURE WAS THE SAME AS THE TOTAL AMOUNT OF SOVIET REDUCTIONS UNDER THE AGREEMENT PROPOSED BY THE EAST AND ACCORDING TO EASTERN DATA. AS A NEXT STEP, POLAND COULD INCREASE 20,000, CZECHOSLOVAKIA INCREASE 20,000 AND THE GDR 15,000. AS A RESULT OF THESE CHANGES, WARSAW PACT WOULD BE AT ITS 700,000 CEILING AND THE SOVIET UNION WOULD BE AT ITS PRE-REDUCTION LEVEL. THE OTHER WARSAW PACT PARTICIPANTS TAKEN

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TOGETHER WOULD BE 55,000 BELOW THEIR POSTREDUCTION LEVELS.

16. TARASOV SAID THIS QUESTION PERTAINED TO THE SAME HYPOTHETICAL SITUATION WHICH EASTERN REPS HAD MENTIONED PREVIOUSLY. ONE COULD HARDLY ASSUME THAT SUCH DRASTIC CHANGES COULD TAKE PLACE IN THE CORRELATION OF FORCES ON THE WARSAW TREATY COUNTRIES. HOWEVER, IF THE WESTERN STATES WERE TO ACCEPT THAT NONE OF THE DIRECT

PARTICIPANTS SHOULD INCREASE FOLLOWING THE REDUCTIONS OF ITS OWN FORCES ACCORDING TO THE AGREEMENT, AND TO AGREE THAT THEY WOULD NOT EXCEED THEIR RESIDUAL LEVEL, THEN THE EASTERN PARTICIPANTS WOULD ACCEPT WITH SATISFACTION ANY UNDERSTANDING ON THIS ISSUE.

17. TARASOV SAID THAT THE ARTIFICIAL NATURE OF THE WESTERN QUESTION COULD BE DEMONSTRATED IF ONE TOOK THE EXAMPLE OF THE GDR GROUND FORCES. IF THE AGREED REDUCTIONS OF THE GDR GROUND FORCES ACCORDING TO AN AGREEMENT WERE TO BE ABOUT 13 PCT, AND, IMMEDIATELY AFTER THAT, THE GDR SHOULD REDUCE AN ADDITIONAL 30,000 MEN, THEN, IN PRACTICAL TERMS, THIS WOULD MEAN THAT THE GDR WOULD, ADDING THESE REDUCTIONS TOGETHER, REDUCE ITS GROUND FORCES BY ALMOST ONE HALF. IN PRACTICAL TERMS, THIS WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE.

18. US REP SAID HE WISHED TO MAKE THE POINT, AS WESTERN REPS HAD DONE PREVIOUSLY, THAT IT WOULD DIMINISH WESTERN SECURITY IF THE SOVIET UNION WERE IN A POSITION

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UNDER A REDUCTION AGREEMENT BOTH TO RESOTORE ITS REDUCTIONS IN THE AREA AND TO HAVE UNLIMITED FORCES IN THE ADJACENT HOMELAND.

19. TARASOV SAID THAT HE COULD ONLY SAY TO THESE REMARKS THAT THE SECURITY OF THE EASTERN PARTICIPANTS WOULD ALSO BE DIMINISHED IF ANY OF THE LARGER EUROPEAN STATES WERE ABLE IN THE FUTURE TO RESTORE ITS FORCES AFTER REDUCTIONS.

20. US REP SAID HIS FIFTH QUESTION WAS: AT THE LAST INFORMAL SESSION, WESTERN PARTICIPANTS HAD POINTED OUT THAT, UNDER THE EASTERN PROPOSAL, THE SITUATION COULD ARISE WHERE IT WAS MATHEMATICALLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR ONE SIDE TO COMPENSATE FULLY FOR UNILATERAL REDUCTIONS AND RESTORE THE AGREED, COLLECTIVE LEVELS OF ITS FORCES. AMBASSADOR TARASOV HAD STATED THAT IN SUCH AN INSTANCE, IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO FIND A SOLUTION AMONG THE NEGOTIATING PARTICIPANTS, AS LONG
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AS THE PARTICIPANTS AGREED TO MAINTAIN THE COLLECTIVE LEVEL OF THEIR FORCES. DID THIS MEAN THAT THE TWO SIDES WOULD AGREE IN THE AGREEMENT THAT EACH SIDE WOULD BE PERMITTED TO MAINTAIN THE AGREED CEILING ON GROUND FORCE MANPOWER, EVEN IF THE ONLY WAY THIS WERE MATHEMATICALLY POSSIBLE WOULD BE FOR ONE OR MORE PARTICIPANTS EITHER TO INCREASE ITS GROUND FORCES BY MORE THAN 50 PCT OF THE TOTAL UNILATERAL REDUCTIONS ON THEIR SIDE, OR TO A LEVEL GREATER THAN THEIR PRE-REDUCTION LEVEL?

21. TARASOV SAID THE EASTERN PROPOSALS WERE PROCEEDING FROM THE TASK OF STRENGTHENING STABILITY IN EUROPE AND MAINTAINING APPROXIMATELY THE SAME CORRELATION OF FORCES WHICH EXISTED AT PRESENT, BUT AT A LOWER LEVEL. IF THE WESTERN STATES BELIEVED THAT IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE THAT IN THE NEAREST FUTURE AFTER AN AGREEMENT HAD BEEN SIGNED AND IMPLEMENTED, SOME DRASTIC CHANGES IN THE CORRELATION OF FORCES OF THE COUNTRIES IN THE AREA COULD TAKE PLACE, THEN THEY COULD SUBMIT IN THE NEGOTIATIONS THEIR PROPOSALS CONCERNING THE WAY IN WHICH PARTICIPANTS COULD FIND A WAY OUT OF SUCH A SITUATION IF IT SHOULD OCCUR.

22. US REP SAID HIS SIXTH QUESTION WAS: UNDER THE EASTERN PROPOSAL, IN THE SECOND STAGE, WOULD THE US AND USSR TAKE THEIR REMAINING REDUCTIONS IN STEP 1 OR STEP 2?

23. TARASOV SAID EASTERN REPS WOULD ANSWER THIS QUESTION LATER.

24. US REP SAID HIS SEVENTH QUESTION WAS: UNDER THE GENERAL PROVISIONS OF ITS PROPOSAL, THE EAST STATED THAT, QUOTE AFTER THE CONCLUSION OF THE PROCESS OF REDUCTION IN THE FIRST AND SECOND STAGES, IT WOULD NOT BE PROHIBITED

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TO CARRY OUT A RELOCATION OF THE REMAINING INDIVIDUAL MILITARY FORMATIONS WITHIN THE REDUCTIONS AREA AT THE DISCRETION OF ONE OR ANOTHER STAGE. UNQUOTE. WESTERN REPS ASSUMED THAT THIS DID NOT MEAN THAT RELOCATION OF REMAINING MILITARY FORMATIONS WOULD BE PROHIBITED DURING THE 3-4 YEARS THAT REDUCTIONS WERE BEING IMPLEMENTED. WAS THIS ASSUMPTION CORRECT?

25. TARASOV SAID THAT, THE ASSUMPTION DESCRIBED BY THE US REP WAS CORRECT.

26. US REP SAID THESE WERE ALL THE QUESTIONS HE HAD AT THIS TIME.

27. TARASOV SAID THAT, IN THE PRESENT SESSION, EASTERN REPS WANTED TO DEAL IN MORE DETAIL WITH THE 8 JUNE PROPOSALS OF THE EASTERN PARTICIPANTS CONCERNING THE REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS BY DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN THE SECOND STAGE.

28. TARASOV SAID, IN ELABORATING THEIR PROPOSALS ON THIS ISSUE, EASTERN PARTICIPANTS WERE TRYING FIRST OF ALL TO TAKE CONSTRUCTIVELY INTO ACCOUNT THE POSITION OF THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS AS SET FORTH IN THEIR APRIL 19 PROPOSALS. WESTERN PARTICIPANTS SURELY HAD NOTICED THAT THE EASTERN PARTICIPANTS HAD ACCEPTED TO A CONSIDERABLE EXTENT THE FIRST ALTERNATIVE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS HAD PROPOSED FOR PHASE 2 REDUCTIONS. THIS MEANT THAT, IN THE BEGINNING OF THE SECOND STAGE, ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS OTHER THAN THE US AND THE USSR WOULD REDUCE THEIR FORCES BY 40 PCT OF THE OVERALL STRENGTH OF FORCES TO BE REDUCED. LATER, THOSE STATES WOULD REDUCE THEIR FORCES BY THE REMAINING 60 PCT. AT THE SAME TIME, THE US AND THE USSR WOULD ADDITIONALLY REDUCE A NUMBER OF FORCES SUCH THAT IN PERCENTAGE TERMS, TAKING

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INTO ACCOUNT THEIR FORCE REDUCTIONS IN THE FIRST STAGE,
IT WOULD CORRESPOND TO THE PERCENTAGE OF THE FORCES
REDUCED BY ALL THE OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS MEMBERS
OF THE NATO OR THE WARSAW TREATY COUNTRIES RESPECTIVELY. IT WAS
IMPORTANT TO BEAR IN MIND THAT DIRECT PARTICIPANTS OTHER
THAN THE USSR AND THE US WOULD UNDERTAKE THEIR REDUCTIONS
AS PROPOSED BY THE WEST ONLY AFTER WITHDRAWAL OF A
SUBSTANTIAL PORTION OF US AND SOVIET FORCES IN THE FIRST
STAGE. BESIDES, SUCH REDUCTIONS WOULD BE CARRIED OUT
PROGRESSIVELY. FIRST, A SMALLER PART AND THEN A LARGER
PART OF THE FORCES WOULD BE REDUCED.

29. TARASOV SAID BOTH WESTERN AND EASTERN PROPOSALS
PROVIDED FOR CARRYING OUT SEPARATE NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF A SECOND STAGE AGREEMENT. AT THE SAME
TIME, THE PROPOSALS OF THE EASTERN PARTICIPANTS FOR A
SECOND STAGE POSSESSED A NUMBER OF UNDENIABLE ADVANTAGES
AS COMPARED TO THE WESTERN PROPOSALS. FIRST, IN STARTING
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STAGE 2 NEGOTIATIONS, THE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD HAVE
THE PRECISE IDEA THAT THE SUBJECT TO BE DISCUSSED AND
SOLVED AT THESE NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BE THE SPECIFIC
METHOD OF FORCE REDUCTIONS BY ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS.
MEANWHILE, THE SCOPE OF SUCH REDUCTIONS WOULD ALREADY BE
DETERMINED IN THE FIRST STAGE AGREEMENT. ON THE OTHER HAND, IT WAS
DIFFICULT TO UNDERSTAND FROM THE WESTERN PROPOSALS WHAT THESE
NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BE DEVOTED TO AND WHETHER THEY WERE
NEEDED AT ALL. INDEED, ACCORDING TO THE WESTERN SCHEME,
THE ISSUE OF THE NUMBER OF FORCES TO BE REDUCED BY
ONE OR ANOTHER WESTERN EUROPEAN STATE OR CANADA WAS
TO BE SOLVED NOT AT ALL IN THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS,
BUT BY THE NATO AUTHORITIES. SIMILARY, AS EASTERN

REPS UNDERSTOOD IT, THESE WESTERN COUNTRIES ALSO WANTED TO ESTABLISH THE METHOD OF REDUCTIONS FOR THEMSELVES, AT THEIR OWN DETERMINATION, SINCE THEY HAD SO FAR NOT STATED THEIR READINESS TO REDUCE THEIR FORCES IN UNITS AND SUB-UNITS AND STILL REFUSED TO REDUCE ANY ARMAMENTS.

30. TARASOV CONTINUED THAT SECOND, THE PROPOSALS OF THE EASTERN PARTICIPANTS PLACED ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN THE SAME EQUAL POSITION. EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES WERE PROPOSING THAT THE SCOPE OF REDUCTIONS SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED FOR EACH STATE INDIVIDUALLY AND IN SUCH A WAY AS TO BE APPROXIMATELY PROPORTIONATE TO THE TOTAL NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF ITS FORCES. THE WEST, ON THE CONTRARY, INSISTED ON ESTABLISHING THE OVERALL NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF MANPOWER TO BE REDUCED IN THE SECOND PHASE BY DIRECT PARTICIPANTS OTHER THAN THE US AND THE USSR. AT THE SAME TIME, THIS APPROACH CONTAINED CLEARLY FORMULATED DEMANDS TO THE TWO POWERS. THE SOVIET UNION, FOR INSTANCE, WAS EXPECTED TO REDUCE QUITE A DEFINITE NUMBER OF DIVISIONS AND TANKS. IN RETURN, IT WAS EXPECTED TO CONTENT ITSELF WITH THE FACT THAT THE WESTERN EUROPEAN
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COUNTRIES, WHOSE FORCES AMOUNTED TO 75 PCT OF NATO ARMED FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE, WOULD UNDERTAKE VAGUE AND UNSPECIFIED COMMITMENTS. WAS THIS EQUITABLE OR ACCEPTABLE? OF COURSE NOT.

31. TARASOV CONTINUED THAT, ALTHOUGH THE WESTERN PROPOSALS OF 19 APRIL CONTAINED AN INDICATION THAT THE REMAINING WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS OTHER THAN THE US WOULD REDUCE IN THE SECOND PHASE THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THEIR FORCES, THIS INDICATION HOWEVER WAS NOT IN THE EASTERN VIEW SUFFICIENTLY UNAMBIGUOUS AND SPECIFIC. THIS CONCLUSION WAS BASED ON THE FACT THAT THE WESTERN COUNTRIES, IN THE EVENT THEIR PROPOSALS WERE TO BE ACCEPTED, WOULD OBTAIN THE POSSIBILITY OF REDUCING FORCES AT THEIR OWN DISCRETION IN A WAY WHICH THEY WOULD CHOOSE BY THEMSELVES. IN THIS EVENT, THE ARMED FORCES OF SOME OF THEM, INCLUDING THE COUNTRIES TAKING LEADING POSITIONS IN THE NATO MILITARY SYSTEM COULD BE EXEMPTED FROM REDUCTIONS AT ALL.

32. FRG REP ASKED HOW IT WAS POSSIBLE TO UNDERSTAND THE WESTERN APRIL 19 PROPOSALS IN THIS WAY.

33. TARASOV CONTINUED - OR WOULD TAKE ONLY A PURELY SYMBOLIC PART IN REDUCTIONS.

34. FRG REP SAID THAT THIS LAST REMARK HAD MADE CLEAR THAT THE FIRST PART OF TARASOV'S CRITICISM HAD BEEN BASELESS.

35. TARASOV ASKED, DID THIS MEAN THAT FRG REP AGREED
AT LEAST TO THE SECOND PART?

36. TARASOV CONTINUED, NATURALLY, THE EASTERN
PARTICIPANTS COULD NOT ACCEPT SUCH A SITUATION, ONE WHICH,
MOREOVER, WOULD OBVIOUSLY CONTRADICT THE PRINCIPLES OF

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SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO USMISSION USNATO
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AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
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MUTUALITY, EQUALITY AND UNDIMINISHED SECURITY OF EITHER
SIDE.

37. TARASOV SAID THE PROPOSALS WHICH HAD BEEN
SUBMITTED BY THE EAST ELIMINATED THESE CITED DEFECTS
OF THE WESTERN SCHEME. FIRST, THE EAST HAD PROPOSED
THAT EACH DIRECT PARTICIPANT SHOULD UNDERTAKE COMMITMENTS
TO REDUCE ITS ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS. SECONDLY,
THE EAST HAD PROPOSED THAT THE COMMITMENT SHOULD CONTAIN
AN INDICATION OF THE GENERAL SCOPE OF REDUCTIONS OF
ITS GROUND FORCE NUMERICAL STRENGTH. THE EASTERN
PROPOSAL PROVIDING THAT, IF THE METHOD OF REDUCTIONS OF
ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN THE SECOND STAGE HAD NOT
BEEN AGREED UPON, IT SHOULD BE CARRIED OUT IN CONFORMITY
WITH THE METHOD ENVISAGED FOR THE USSR AND THE USA IN THE
FIRST STAGE, WAS IMPORTANT IN THIS RESPECT. BUT IF THIS
METHOD WERE TO DIFFER SIGNIFICANTLY FROM THAT ENVISAGED

FOR THE REDUCTION OF THE FORCES OF THE USSR AND THE USA,

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THESE TWO STATES WOULD HAVE THE RIGHT TO CONSIDER THEMSELVES FREE FROM THE OBLIGATIONS UNDERTAKEN BY THEM IN THE FIRST STAGE AGREEMENT.

38. TARASOV CONTINUED THAT THE LATTER RESERVATION WAS A QUITE REASONABLE AND NATURAL ONE. IT SET CERTAIN BARRIERS IN THE WAY OF THOSE WHO WOULD TRY TO CIRCUMVENT THE AGREEMENT AND TO GAIN FOR THEMSELVES ADVANTAGES AT THE EXPENSE OF THE OTHER SIDE'S INTERESTS. WOULD NOT WESTERN PARTICIPANTS AGREE, THAT, IF THE EASTERN PARTICIPANTS WERE TO REDUCE THEIR FORCES BY WITHDRAWING WHOLE FORMATIONS, UNITS AND SUBUNITS, AND WOULD REDUCE AND LIMITE IMPORTANT TYPES OF THEIR ARMAMENTS, WHILE THE WESTERN EUROPEAN NATO MEMBERS WOULD ONLY DISCHARGE INDIVIDUAL SOLDIERS FROM THEIR ARMED FORCES WITHOUT, MOREOVER, REDUCING ANY ARMAMENTS, THEN ANY MUTUALITY, EQUALITY, OR COMPLIANCE WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY WOULD BE OUT OF THE QUESTION?

39. TARASOV SAID THE BASIC CRITERIA FOR SOLVING THE PROBLEM OF WHETHER THE SECOND STAGE REDUCTION WAS OR WAS NOT CARRIED OUT IN CONFORMITY WITH THE METHOD OF FORCE REDUCTIONS ESTABLISHED FOR THE USSR AND THE USA IN THE FIRST STAGE COULD BE, IN THE EASTERN OPINION, THE FOLLOWING: FIRST, REDUCTIONS OF FORCES BY UNITS AND SUB-UNITS. SECOND, PARTICIPATION OF ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN ARMAMENT REDUCTIONS. THESE TWO CRITERIA WERE TAKEN AS THE BASIS FOR THE FIRST STAGE AGREEMENT CONCERNING SOVIET AND US FORCES. THEY ALSO SHOULD BE TAKEN AS THE BASIS FOR THE STAGE 2 AGREEMENT. IF ALL THE STATES PARTICIPATING IN THE NEGOTIATIONS DISPLAYED GOODWILL, AND DESIRED TO BRING THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS TO A SURE OUTCOME, SUCH AN AGREEMENT WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY BE ACHIEVED.

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40. TARASOV REQUESTED THAT THE TEMPO OF THE SESSION SHOULD BE STEPPED UP TO PERMIT HIM TO LEAVE AT A TIME EARLIER THAN USUAL AND INDICATED EAST WAS PREPARED TO ANSWER EARLIER WESTERN QUESTION. WESTERN REPS AGREED THAT, TO SAVE TIME, EASTERN REPS SHOULD PROCEED IMMEDIATELY WITH THEIR PRESENTATIONS.

41. GDR REP SAID HE WISHED ON BEHALF OF THE EASTERN

PARTICIPANTS TO ANSWER THE REMAINING FOUR QUESTIONS RAISED BY WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES IN THE JUNE 13 SESSION REGARDING THE EAST'S NEW PROPOSAL. QUESTIONS NUMBER 7 AND 9, WHICH HAD BEEN ASKED BY THE FRG REP AND QUESTION NUMBER 8, ASKED BY THE US REP HAD REFERRED TO FUTURE LIMITS TO BE IMPOSED ON CERTAIN TYPES OF GROUND FORCE UNITS AND SUBUNITS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE NEW EASTERN PROPOSALS. THE REPLY TO THESE QUESTIONS WAS THAT, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROPOSALS SUBMITTED BY THE EASTERN PARTICIPANTS ON JUNE 8, LIMITATIONS SHOULD BE APPLIED TO THOSE FORMATIONS AND UNITS OF THE GROUND FORCES SUBJECTED TO REDUCTION. THIS MEANT THAT, FOLLOWING REDUCTIONS, LIMITATIONS WOULD BE APPLIED TO THE NUMBER OF THE LARGEST MAIN FORMATIONS, UNITS AND SUBUNITS OF EACH STATE BY WHICH THIS STATE WAS GOING TO REDUCE ITS FORCES. IF FOR EXAMPLE, USSR WAS REDUCING ITS FORCES BY DIVISIONS, THE NUMBER OF ITS DIVISIONS WOULD THEN BE LIMITED. IF THE USA WOULD BE REDUCING ITS FORCES BY BRIGADES, THE NUMBER OF ITS BRIGADES WOULD SUBSEQUENTLY BE LIMITED. IF, FOR EXAMPLE, SOME COUNTRY WERE TO REDUCE ITS FORCES BY REGIMENTS AND BATTALIONS, ITS REGIMENTS AND BATTALIONS

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WOULD BE LIMITED ACCORDINGLY. IN THIS CONNECTION IT
WOULD NOT BE FORBIDDEN TO INCREASE THE NUMBER OF
SMALLER MILITARY SUBUNITS. LIMITATIONS WERE ALSO NOT

GOING TO BE ESTABLISHED ON THOSE TYPES OF FORMATIONS,
UNITS AND SUBUNITS, WHICH WERE NOT GOING TO BE REDUCED.
THIS MEANT, THAT, SUPPOSING THAT ONE COUNTRY REDUCED TANK
BATTALIONS, THE NUMBER OF ITS CONSTRUCTION ENGINEER
BATTALIONS WOULD NOT BE LIMITED.

42. GDR REP SAID THAT, IN THE WEST'S TENTH QUESTION, THE
FRG REP HAD ASKED ABOUT TYPES OF ARMAMENTS TO BE REDUCED
BY THE USA IN THE FIRST STAGE (REFERENCE WAS TO WESTERN
UNDERSTANDING THAT THE US WOULD NOT BE REQUIRED TO WITHDRAW OR
LIMIT THE ARMAMENTS OF ITS WITHDRAWN UNITS OTHER THAN THE
SPECIFIED NUCLEAR ELEMENTS.) GDR REP SAID THE EASTERN REPLY
WAS THAT THE WESTERN UNDERSTANDING WAS CORRECT.

43. GDR REP SAID HIS SECOND QUESTION WAS THAT, IN THEIR
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ESTIMATES OF THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE FORCES, WESTERN
REPS, EVEN AFTER AN ADDITIONAL EXCHANGE OF OFFICIAL NUMBERS
HAD TAKEN PLACE, CONTINUED TO MAINTAIN THAT THERE ALLEGEDLY
EXISTED A LARGE DISPARITY BETWEEN THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF
THE FORCES OF THE NATO COUNTRIES AND THOSE OF THE WARSAW
TREATY COUNTRIES IN THE REDUCTION AREA. COULD WESTERN REPS
NOW TELL EASTERN REPS, NOW THAT WESTERN REPS IN PRACTICE
HAD DATA ON THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE NATIONAL FORCES OF
THE EASTERN PARTICIPANTS, WITH WHICH COUNTRIES THERE WERE
WHICH DISCREPANCIES BETWEEN THE EAST'S OFFICIAL DATA AND
THE WESTERN ESTIMATES? THE WESTERN REPLY TO THIS QUESTION
WOULD DOUBTLESS HELP PARTICIPANTS TO IDENTIFY THE SOURCES
OF THE DISCREPANCY AND TO SHORTEN THE DATA DISCUSSION. RESOR

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